


U.S. Department of Justice





OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS 425 Eye Street N.W. ULLB. 3rd Floor Washington, D.C. 20536



FILE:

Office: Baltimore

Date:

EEB 1 4 2000

IN RE: Applicant: APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8

U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

wentifying data delated to prevent clearly unwarranted

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,

Perrance M. O'Reilly, Director Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Peru who was admitted to the United States on March 26, 1988 as a nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to remain for six months. The applicant failed to depart and remained longer than authorized. The applicant obtained employment by purchasing and then using a fraudulent alien registration card on one occasion by falsely claiming to be a U.S citizen on another occasion. The applicant was ordered deported on October 25, 1991 but has failed to depart. Therefore he is inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). applicant married a United States citizen on August 13, 1996 and is the beneficiary of an approved immediate relative visa petition. The applicant seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), to remain in the United States with his wife.

The director determined that the unfavorable factors outweighed the favorable ones and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant has submitted ample documentation evidencing substantial equities in favor of granting him permission to reapply for admission. Counsel states that the district director did not give proper weight to the applicant's equities. Counsel then discusses the applicant's strong family ties, the extreme hardship that his removal would impose upon his wife, the need for his services and he is otherwise admissible.

Section 212(a)(9) ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED. -

(A) CERTAIN ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED. -

- (i) ARRIVING ALIENS.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under § 235(b)(1) [1225] or at the end of proceedings under § 240 [1229a] initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.
- (ii) OTHER ALIENS.-Any alien not described in clause(i) who-
 - (I) has been ordered removed under § 240 [1229a] or any other provision of law, or
 - (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding,

and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) EXCEPTION.-Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act provides that aliens who have been otherwise ordered removed, ordered deported under former §§ 242 or 217 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252 or 1187, or ordered excluded under former § 236 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1226, and who have actually been removed (or departed after such an order) are inadmissible for 10 years. The provision holding aliens inadmissible for 10 years after the issuance of an exclusion or deportation order applies to such orders rendered both before and after April 1, 1997.

Section 212(a)(6)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(B), was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and is now codified as § 212(a)(9)(A)(i) and (ii). According to the reasoning in Matter of Soriano, Interim Decision 3289 (BIA, A.G. 1996), the provisions of any legislation modifying the Act must normally be applied to waiver applications adjudicated on or after the enactment date of that legislation, unless other instructions are provided. IIRIRA became effective on September 30, 1996.

An appeal must be decided according to the law as it exists on the date it is before the appellate body. See <u>Bradley v. Richmond School Board</u>, 416 U.S. 696, 710-1 (1974). In the absence of explicit statutory direction, an applicant's eligibility is determined under the statute in effect at the time his or her application is finally considered. If an amendment makes the statute more restrictive after the application is filed, the eligibility is determined under the terms of the amendment. Conversely, if the amendment makes the statute more generous, the application must be considered by more generous terms. <u>Matter of George</u>, 11 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1965); <u>Matter of Leveque</u>, 12 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 1968).

The Service has held that an application for permission to reapply for admission to the United States may be approved when the applicant establishes he or she has equities within the United States or there are other favorable factors which offset the fact of deportation or removal at Government expense and any other adverse factors which may exist. Circumstances which are considered by the Service include, but are not limited to: the basis for removal; the recency of removal; the length of residence in the United States; the moral character of the applicant; the alien's respect for law and order; the evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the existence of family responsibilities within the United States; any inadmissibility to the United States under other sections of the law; the hardship involved to the alien and to others; and the need for the applicant's services in the United

States. <u>Matter of Tin</u>, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973). An approval in this proceeding requires the applicant to establish that the favorable aspects outweigh the unfavorable ones.

It is appropriate to examine the basis of a removal as well as an applicant's general compliance with immigration and other laws. Evidence of serious disregard for law is viewed as an adverse factor. Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978). Family ties in the United States are an important consideration in deciding whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Matter of Acosta, 14 I&N Dec. 361 (D.D. 1973).

In <u>Matter of Tin</u>, the Regional Commissioner held that such an unlawful presence is evidence of disrespect for law. The Regional Commissioner noted also that the applicant gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present subsequent to that return. The Regional Commissioner stated that the alien obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country. The Regional Commissioner then concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would appear to be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. Following <u>Tin</u>, an equity gained while in an unlawful status can be given only minimal weight.

The court held in <u>Garcia-Lopez v. INS</u>, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. <u>Ghassan v. INS</u>, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), <u>cert. denied</u>, 507 U.S. 971 (1993).

It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity (referred to as "after-acquired family ties" in Matter of Tijam, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998)) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1988, remained longer than authorized, was ordered deported in 1991 and married his spouse in August 1996. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

The applicant purchased an alien registration card for \$100.00 and used that document to obtain employment in 1991. The applicant was charged with the crime of first degree forgery. He pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of forgery. Forgery is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter of S-C-, 3 I&N Dec. 350 (BIA 1949); Matter of F-, 6 I&N Dec. 783 (BIA 1955); Matter of M, 9 I&N Dec. 132 (BIA 1960). The applicant engaged in unauthorized employment in the United States for approximately six years. The applicant's wife has earned a Master's Degree, is gainfully employed and does not depend on the applicant for support.

The favorable factors in this matter are the applicant's family ties and the approved immediate relative visa petition.

The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's overstay of his nonimmigrant admission, his purchase and use of a fraudulent immigration document to obtain employment without Service authorization, his misdemeanor conviction, his being ordered deported, his failure to surrender and depart and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in Matter of Lee, supra, that he could only relate a positive factor of residence in the United States where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law, would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equities (marriage and employment) gained while being unlawfully present in the United States (and a marriage entered into while in deportation proceedings) can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

In discretionary matters, the applicant bears the full burden of proving eligibility in terms of equities in the United States which are not outweighed by adverse factors. See Matter of T-S-Y-, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957); and Matter of Ducret, 15 I&N Dec. 620 (BIA 1976). After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish he warrants the favorable exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.